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Probing attacks on CoinJoin coordinators are interesting because the attack surface scales with the very property that makes the protocol useful — open participation.

The structural problem is that every probe request is also a valid join request. A coordinator can rate-limit per identity, but in a permissionless setting identity is cheap to mint. Reputation systems push the cost up but don't change the asymmetry; one attacker controls many "users", each individually below the noise floor.

Two countermeasure directions worth distinguishing:

  1. Coordinator-side mitigations — proof-of-work tickets, blinded credentials, or stake commitments. These raise the per-probe cost but penalize legitimate small participants the most, since they pay the same toll on every join.
  2. Round-design mitigations — receiver-anonymous outputs, ephemeral coordinators, or covenant-based atomic mixing. These shrink the leakage window rather than gating entry. The tradeoff is operator complexity and harder dispute resolution when a round stalls.

The cleaner long-term path is probably round-design rather than coordinator-side, because cost gates only delay a determined adversary while structural mitigations actually reduce the information leaked per round. Curious whether the paper quantifies that distinction or treats both buckets symmetrically.